Does choice change preference? by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Granic, Georg
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3229632 
Does Choice Change Preferences?∗
Carlos Alo´s-Ferrer†
University of Zurich
Georg D. Granic‡
Erasmus University Rotterdam
This Version: August 9th, 2018
Abstract
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1 Introduction
Do we choose what we prefer, or do we prefer what we choose? The origins and sta-
bility of preferences are a topic of tantamount importance for economics (Stigler and
Becker, 1977; Bowles, 1998; Fehr and Hoff, 2011). Positive economics is based on the
possibility to organize observed choices through underlying preferences to forecast fu-
ture choices, and normative economics rests on the assumption that welfare comparisons
can be derived from those preferences. Yet, experimental evidence has repeatedly cast
doubt on whether preferences can be seen as consistent and stable, or rather be swayed
by extraneous elements. For example, Ariely et al. (2003) suggested that the forma-
tion of preferences might be affected by numerical anchoring, a conclusion challenged by
Fudenberg et al. (2012) and Maniadis et al. (2014).
The most striking critique of the economists’ approach to preferences is probably the
claim that the mere act of choice can feed back into and alter pre-existing preferences,
which has been long considered as a firmly-established fact in psychology, neuroscience,
and cognitive science. Widely-replicated empirical evidence going back to Brehm (1956)
(see, e.g., Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999; Ariely and Norton, 2008) shows specific pat-
terns of preference change, elicited by liking ratings or rankings, after a binary choice
and without any additional information being received. A classical explanation involves
cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; Joule, 1986), which in this context essen-
tially states that every choice involves facing tradeoffs, and that the negative aspects
of the chosen option and the positive aspects of the rejected one create a psychological
tension which the decision maker attempts to reduce by changing the preferences. More
generally, cognitive dissonance theory asserts that attitudes and beliefs are often brought
in line with actions (as in the induced-compliance paradigm; Festinger and Carlsmith,
1959), especially if they are costly or effortful (as in the effort-justification paradigm;
Aronson and Mills, 1959). The importance of these phenomena for economics, especially
with respect to beliefs, has been previously pointed out by Akerlof and Dickens (1982),
Konow (2000), and Oxoby (2004).
However, in spite of an apparently-overwhelming body of evidence, the phenomenon
of choice-induced preference change has so far been met with skepticism in economics.
There are three good reasons for this reaction. First, most of the experiments which
the psychological evidence builds upon test preferences over unfamiliar or ill-defined
choices, as e.g. liking ratings of artistic paintings or hypothetical holiday destinations
described exclusively by the destination name. In such cases, preferences might not
be fully formed and behavior might be extremely noisy, with measurements reflecting
preference formation and not change.1 Second, experimental choices in this area are
typically hypothetical and unincentivized, casting doubts on whether observed behavior
1One of the few examples where evidence for choice-induced preference change has been found outside
the lab is the study of Mullainathan and Washington (2009), which exploited turnout constraints due
to the voting age restriction to examine the effect of voting in subsequent political preferences in the
United States. However, a similar study by Elinder (2012) found no evidence of preference change.
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is actually indicative of preferences in economic settings. Third, it has been recently
shown that the experimental paradigm introduced by Brehm (1956), which has guided
the development of the literature for over 50 years, is regrettably flawed, in the sense
that it contains a statistical bias that can result in apparent preference change even if
participants have immutable preferences, as long as they display noisy (but unbiased)
behavior (Chen and Risen, 2010; Izuma and Murayama, 2013; Alo´s-Ferrer and Shi, 2015).
Although this flaw does not affect other aspects of cognitive dissonance and the specific
phenomenon has been reexamined with improved designs (Sharot et al., 2010; Alo´s-
Ferrer et al., 2012), the fact remains that the body of evidence in favor of choice-induced
preference change cannot be currently called “overwhelming” anymore.
In this work, we ask the question of whether the phenomenon of preference change
due to own choice actually occurs in economic settings. We provide a novel experi-
mental paradigm addressing all three critiques mentioned above. Participants face fully-
incentivized choices within a standard economic task (decisions under risk). Further, the
very fact that we use a well-defined economic domain allows us to develop a design which
does not suffer from statistical biases. We then report on two separate experiments (for
robustness reasons) relying on the same basic design.
The results are striking. While we do find evidence for choice-induced preference
change, the characteristics of the change itself are not stable across experiments and
might depend on apparently irrelevant details. The implication is that either the phe-
nomenon is real but not systematic (or not of a sufficient magnitude to be easily mea-
surable) or none of the currently available theories from psychology, and in particular
cognitive dissonance theory, can actually explain the phenomenon.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the typical paradigms
and design difficulties appearing in psychology and presents our improved paradigm.
Section 3 presents the specific design and describes the experiments. Section 4 presents
the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Previous Evidence and an Improved, Economic Approach
Since Brehm (1956), which motivated the development of cognitive dissonance theory
(Festinger, 1957), most evidence on choice-induced preference change has been collected
using the free choice paradigm (FCP). Experiments following this approach collect data
on a finite set of alternatives, A, in three stages. In Stage 1 (the first evaluation phase),
rankings or ratings on A are elicited. For concreteness, we focus on rankings. Let R1(a)
denote the numerical rank of each alternative a ∈ A, with lower numbers indicating a
better placement (first, second, etc). In Stage 2 (the choice phase), the experimenter
(or a computer algorithm) produces choice pairs (a, b) ∈ A2, a 6= b, such that R1(a)
and R1(b) were close (e.g., differing by 1 rank), and the participant is asked to choose
an option out of each constructed pair. In Stage 3 (the second evaluation phase), new
rankings R2(a) are elicited for each a ∈ A.
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For a pair (a, b) offered in the choice phase, suppose a was the alternative chosen by
the participant, and b the one rejected. The dependent variable in all experiments using
the FCP is the spread
S(a, b) = (R2(a)−R2(b))− (R1(a)−R1(b)) (1)
The hypothesis, which has been confirmed in a large number of experiments, is that
E[S(a, b)] < 0 (E[S(a, b)] > 0 for the case of ratings), where E[·] denotes the expectation.
This is interpreted as evidence that chosen options are typically reevaluated upwards
and rejected ones are reevaluated downwards, the argument being that, with immutable
preferences, one should have observed no change in ranks.
This design contains a methodological flaw, as was first pointed out by Chen and
Risen (2010) and further discussed in Izuma and Murayama (2013) and Alo´s-Ferrer and
Shi (2015). Although the point is subtle (and hence escaped notice for over 50 years),
essentially the problem is that in the construction of S(a, b), the identities of a and b are
not randomized. In a stochastic choice setting, where both choices and rankings follow
from underlying preferences with zero-mean noise, the fact that a has been chosen over
b carries information on the underlying preferences. Roughly speaking, noisy rankings
in Phase 1 will tend to be corrected in the direction of the true preference in Phase
3, and conditioning on choice (which reveals information on the preference) creates a
purely statistical bias.2 This has motivated improved designs which aim to randomize
which option is chosen. In the blind-choice paradigm (Sharot et al., 2010), participants
are deceived to make them believe they have chosen whatever option the experimenter
has predetermined. In the implicit-choice paradigm (Alo´s-Ferrer et al., 2012), “chosen”
options are randomized (say, a) and the participant is offered the choice of a and a
third option with a low elicited evaluation, and reciprocally for the “rejected” option,
resulting in choices typically (but not always) aligned with the predetermined ones.
However, both paradigms retained non-incentivized choices and unfamiliar alternatives
as described above.
Our design keeps the basic three-phase structure typical of the previous literature
(hence allowing for easy comparison) but improves upon it in three respects. First, all
three phases are incentivized following standard practices and methods in economics
(details are provided below). Second, instead of hypothetical holiday destinations or
unfamiliar artistic paintings, the objects of choice are standard lotteries. That is, we
conduct our experiments within the well-studied domain of decisions under risk. It is
2The issue is a relatively complex one. Chen and Risen (2010) provided a formal model and claimed
that, under a certain set of assumptions on the process generating elicited evaluations and choices,
E[S(a, b)] > 0 in the FCP (for ratings). Their proof was shown to be itself flawed by Alo´s-Ferrer and
Shi (2015), who in turn showed that E[S(a, b)] 6= 0 in general, might be either positive or negative,
but E[S(a, b)] > 0 will hold if R1(a) = R1(b) (as implemented in many experiments). Both Izuma and
Murayama (2013) and Alo´s-Ferrer and Shi (2015) provided computer simulations of artificial agents with
immutable preferences and zero-mean noise in evaluations and choices, and found E[S(a, b)] 6= 0 when
such agents “participate” in an FCP experiment.
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precisely these two changes which allow us to completely bypass the third difficulty
and construct a design free of statistical biases. The reason is that, within a well-
defined domain as that of lotteries, and unlike with the fixed sets of options used in
typical psychology experiments, we can construct new lotteries on the fly in the choice
phase (that is, not part of the originally ranked sets). Specifically, the essence of our
design is as follows: given any pair (a, b), where a has been randomly determined (by
the experimenter) to be “chosen” and b to be “rejected,” we construct new lotteries c
and d with the intention of offering the participant the actual choice pairs (a, c) and
(b, d). To ensure that the participant actually chooses a over c (making a chosen)
and d over b (making b rejected), we rely on first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD).
Specifically, we construct d as a lottery which first-order stochastically dominates b,
and c as a lottery first-order stochastically dominated by a. If a lottery stochastically
dominates another lottery the former should be ranked above the latter, independently
of underlying risk attitudes, as long as participants prefer larger amounts of money over
smaller ones.3 Hence one would expect overwhelming compliance with the randomly
determined choices.
To derive our experimental hypotheses, assume that the values Ri(a) follow from
a value-generating process which (noisily) reflects preferences and that choice among
lotteries obeys FOSD. By relying on FOSD, we will randomly and exogenously assign
lotteries to being chosen or not, hence manipulating decision makers into choosing them
or not. If choice-induced preference change is a real phenomenon, lotteries flagged as
chosen should be reevaluated upwards (resulting in lower ranks) compared to lotteries
flagged as rejected. Rather than translating this into a hypothesis on the spread as
given in (1), we note that in our framework it is possible to give a sharper implication
which is transparently free of any possible statistical bias. Suppose the decision maker
has been given separate sets of options to rank, A and A′ (containing the same number
of options), and we focus on options ranked identically within their respective sets,
R1(x|A) = R1(x
′|A′). Now suppose we assign x to be chosen and x′ to be rejected.
The hypothesis above translates into R1(x|A)−R2(x|A) > R1(x
′|A′)−R2(x
′|A′) (recall
that lower ranks indicate a stronger preference), or, since, R1(x|A) = R1(x
′|A′), simply
R2(x|A) < R2(x
′|A′) (in expected terms).
Let x denote an alternative within a set A. From the ex ante point of view, the
reasoning above implies, for any fixed rank r,
E[R2(x)|R1(x) = r, x chosen] < E[R2(x)|R1(x) = r, x rejected] (2)
which delivers our experimental hypothesis for any alternative part of the choice manip-
ulation. Note that, contrary to hypotheses based on (1) as used in psychology, inequality
3This follows immediately under Expected Utility Theory, but it is also a straightforward implication
of other theories as e.g. Cumulative Prospect Theory. In their first version of prospect theory, Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) assumed that transparently dominated lotteries were eliminated in the “editing
phase.”
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Figure 1: Schematic overview experimental design.
Stage 1, ranking R1: rank 6 lotteries in each of 6 lottery groups
Identify a = 3rd-ranked and b = 4th-ranked in each group
33% 33% 33%
2 FCP-lottery groups 2 Target lottery groups 2 Target lottery groups
↓ ↓ ↓
target pair target pair
FCP-pair congruent incongruent
(a, b) (a, c), a ≻FOSD c (a, c), c ≻FOSD a
(b, d), d ≻FOSD b (b, d), b ≻FOSD d
Stage 2, choice task: Independent choices presented.
(a, b) (a, c) (a, c)
(b, d) (b, d)
Stage 3, ranking R2: re-rank lotteries
(2) allows separate tests for the two alternatives involved in a given pair (a, b) manip-
ulated as described above. This is also natural in our design, since there is no direct
choice among a and b.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We conducted two incentivized laboratory experiments to investigate the economic valid-
ity of choice-induced preference change. In each experiment, participants were asked to
rank and choose among simple lotteries (two outcomes, two probabilities), as frequently
employed in judgment and decision making (e.g. Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Grether
and Plott, 1979). To obtain transparent FOSD relationships, we manipulated one lottery
attribute keeping the other one constant. Experiment 1 manipulated the probability do-
main and Experiment 2 manipulated the outcome domain. Otherwise, both experiments
followed the same experimental design, described below and summarized in Figure 1.
3.1 Basic design, incentives, and identification
There were three incentivized decision stages: Two ranking tasks in stages 1 (R1) and
3 (R2), and a choice task in Stage 2. Task-related payments were deferred to the end
of the experiments, i.e. after all relevant decisions were made. We created two lists
of 36 lotteries, one for each experiment. All outcomes were positive EUR amounts
and lotteries were presented as pie charts augmented by a numerical representation of
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possible outcomes and their corresponding probabilities. The order of presentation and
the positioning of lotteries on-screen was randomized. No lottery was used twice.4
Ranking tasks R1 and R2. The 36 lotteries were divided randomly at the participant-
level into six different groups containing six lotteries each. The composition of the six
groups remained fixed during an experiment. In the first (ranking) stage R1, partici-
pants were presented with each group of lotteries sequentially and instructed to rank
lotteries from most (rank 1) to least preferred (rank 6). The third-stage ranking task
R2 was identical to R1 except for a randomized presentation order. The instructions for
R2 explicitly stated that the task was not a memory test.
We adapted the ordinal payoff scheme to incentivize rankings (see e.g. Tversky et al.,
1990; Cubitt et al., 2004; Alo´s-Ferrer et al., 2016). For each ranking task, the computer
randomly selected one of the six groups and two lotteries within it. From those two,
the lottery that the participant had ranked as more desirable was selected and played
out. This payment mechanism elicits ordinal preferences in an incentive-compatible way
(under the reduction of compound lotteries axiom).
Choice task. The choice task in stage 2 consisted of 10 choices. Each of them asked
participants to choose one of two lotteries. We used the 3rd- and 4th-ranked lotteries
(henceforth a and b, respectively) according to R1-rankings from the same lottery group
to construct choice pairs. The middle ranks were chosen to avoid floor and ceiling effects
in potential preference ramifications following choice. For two of the six lottery groups
we asked participants to choose among (a, b) directly. This design replicates the classical
(but flawed) free-choice-paradigm (FCP) extensively used in psychology (Brehm, 1956).5
We refer to those as FCP-pairs. For the remaining four lottery groups the construction
of choice pairs followed the design already sketched above (Figure 1), which relies on
comparing the target lotteries with newly-generated ones. In these groups, lotteries a
and b were part of two independent choice pairs (a, c) and (b, d). We will refer to those
as target pairs.
The key feature of the protocol is to assign what is chosen and rejected randomly.
In two of the four remaining lottery groups, lottery c dominated lottery a and lottery
b dominated lottery d by FOSD, creating four target pairs. Participants who obeyed
FOSD thus ‘rejected’ a and ‘chose’ b. We refer to these pairs as incongruent, as induced
choice patterns were opposite of participants’ revealed R1-rankings for a and b. In the
remaining two lottery groups, lottery a dominated lottery c and lottery d dominated
lottery b, creating four further target pairs. We call these pairs congruent, as choice
patterns reinforced previously stated R1-rankings. Lottery groups from the ranking
stages were randomly assigned to the different construction conditions at the participant
4The different FOSD-construction processes between experiments made it necessary to create
experiment-specific sets of lotteries. Our guiding principles in creating lotteries as well as the lotteries
themselves and the experimental instructions can be found in the supplementary materials.
5To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study choice-induced preference change in the
domain of simple lotteries. We deemed a conceptual replication necessary to establish comparability
with the existing literature.
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level. Each participant faced two FCP-pairs, four incongruent target pairs, and four
congruent target pairs.
After the experiment, a participant’s payment for the choice task was derived by
selecting one of the 10 lottery pairs at random. The participant then received the
lottery she had chosen and that lottery was played out.
Identification. Our design steers free of the statistical biases identified in previous
designs and allows us to isolate the pure effect of choice on preference. Lotteries c
and d were solely constructed for the purpose of inducing the intended choice patterns.
That is, we orthogonalized choice and preference information. Choices and their implied
‘chosen’ and ‘rejected’ labels were uninformative about underlying lottery valuations.
Assuming that participants obeyed FOSD, these labels were purely random. Lotteries a
were chosen in congruent pairs and rejected in incongruent ones (vice versa for lotteries
b). Measuring choice-induced preference change, hence, reduced to a comparison of
post-choice R2-ranks between congruent and incongruent conditions for lotteries a and
b separately.
Identification of choice-induced preference change in this design hinges on partici-
pants obeying FOSD. In our experiments, we introduced transparent FOSD-relationships
and employed treatment manipulations to make sure that the FOSD-compliance rate was
stable. We will present additional results demonstrating that violations of FOSD were
empirically rare events which did not undermine the validity of the choice-randomization
procedure.
3.2 Procedures
The experiments were carried out at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research
and participants were recruited from the same standard student pool using the software
ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). All tasks were computer-implemented using the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). In total, we recruited 296 university students, 140 for Experiment
1 (80 females, mean age 23.3) and 156 for Experiment 2 (91 females, mean age 23.7).
Sessions lasted about 1h 20 min on average, with participants’ average remuneration
amounting to e15.77 and e16.22, respectively.
In Experiment 1, we manipulated the probability domain keeping constant outcomes
to obtain FOSD-relationships in choice pairs. That is, a lottery intended to be chosen
(rejected) was paired with a new, unique lottery with a lower (higher) probability to win
the high amount and a higher (lower) probability to win the low amount. In Experiment
2, FOSD-relationships were obtained via manipulations of the high amount to win in
the outcome domain keeping constant probabilities. Lotteries intended to be chosen (re-
jected) were paired with new, unique lotteries with decreased (increased) high-amounts
to win.
To further ensure that FOSD induced behavior as expected independently of other
factors, in each experiment participants were randomly assigned to one of two possible
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treatments. Those treatments targeted the FOSD compliance rate by increasing the
transparency in FOSD relationships and the costs of FOSD violations. In the High
treatment, FOSD relationships were established by adding or subtracting four percentage
points in probabilities for Experiment 1 and by adding or subtracting 20 Eurocents to
the high amounts to win in Experiment 2. In the Low treatment, probabilities were
changed by two percentage points and outcomes by eight Eurocents. Each participant
faced two FCP pairs, four incongruent target pairs, and four congruent target pairs.6
If behavior follows FOSD independently of the level of incentives, there should be no
differences in the rate of FOSD violations across treatments.
4 Results
Since our manipulation rests on decisions respecting FOSD, we first show that violations
of FOSD were rare events which occurred unsystematically. We then present our main
results concerning target pairs. Last, for comparability with the previous literature,
we establish that our FCP sub-design replicates the standard pattern observed in the
existing literature (even though the design flaw in the FCP prevents drawing conclusions
from this fact).
4.1 FOSD violations
Violations of FOSD were very rare events and did not undermine the validity of the choice
randomization procedure. In total we observed 2,368 decisions where one alternative
dominated the other in the FOSD sense, 1,120 in Experiment 1 and 1,248 in Experiment
2. Only a small fraction of these decisions violated FOSD, respectively 24 (2.1%) and 31
(2.5%). There were no systematic differences in FOSD violations between experimental
treatments nor between congruent and incongruent choice-pairs.7 Hence, we will pool
the High/Low treatments for further analysis.
4.2 Target pairs
Under choice-induced preference change, we expected a positive R2-rank difference be-
tween rejected and chosen lotteries of the same R1-rank (since higher ranks signify lower
preference). Figure 2 shows the corresponding mean participant-averaged R2-rank differ-
ence for lotteries a and b after eliminating the rare observations part of FOSD violations.
6Let (p : x; y) denote a lottery that pays ex with probability p and ey with the complementary
probability 1 − p. Let, for example, a = (0.25 : 12; 2) and b = (0.20 : 10; 5) and suppose we wish to
construct congruent target pairs (a, c) and (b, d), i.e. we want a to be chosen in the pair (a, c) and b to
be rejected in the pair (b, d). In the High treatment of Experiment 1, the construction yields c = (0.21
: 12; 2) and d = (0.24 : 10; 5). In the High treatment of Experiment 2, we obtain c = (0.25 : 11.8; 2)
and d = (0.20 : 10.2; 5).
7In Experiment 1 we observed 15 out of 24 FOSD violations in the High treatment and 13 out of 24
violations in congruent pairs. In Experiment 2, the corresponding figures are 17 out of 31 and 20 out of
31.
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Figure 2: Mean and 95% CI of participant-averaged R2-rank difference between rejected
and chosen flag-conditions in target pairs, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
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We observed a two-fold pattern of asymmetries in R2-rank differences, which was unex-
pected from the point of view of the existing (psychological) literature.
Uninformative choices increased rank evaluations for a-type lotteries (i.e., 3rd-ranked
in R1) in Experiment 1 and b-type lotteries in Experiment 2 (i.e., 4th-ranked in R1).
The corresponding chosen a and b lotteries were R2-ranked, on average, 0.194 and 0.237
positions better than comparable but rejected lotteries a and b, respectively. According
to two-sided Wilcoxon-signed-rank tests, the corresponding median participant-averaged
R2-rank differences were significantly different from zero (p = 0.028 in Experiment 1,
p = 0.023 in Experiment 2).8 This evidence is in line with choice-induced preference
change.
However, for type-b lotteries in Experiment 1 and type-a ones in Experiment 2,
we observed no effect of choice on preference. The mean R2-rank difference between
rejected and chosen lotteries were -0.071 and 0.050, respectively. Wilcoxon-signed-rank
tests failed to detect any significant difference in R2-ranks here (p = 0.827 in Experiment
1, p = 0.410 in Experiment 2).
Our main observations were confirmed by panel generalized-least-squares regressions
with participant random-effects on stated R2-ranks. Table 1 presents the corresponding
results. All standard errors were clustered at the participant level and we used the
full sample of observations (not excluding FOSD violations). Independent observations
were taken at the participant-lottery level. The Choice dummy, taking the value 1 if a
lottery was chosen, was negative and significant at the 5% level for type-a lotteries in
8The significance of all reported hypothesis tests in this paper is robust with respect to Holm-
Bonferroni corrections to account for multiple-hypotheses testing.
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Table 1: Panel generalized least squares regressions on R2-ranks with participant
random-effects. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the par-
ticipant level. High: treatment dummy. Dominance: dummy, 1 if decision in the
choice task violated FOSD. Demographic controls: age, gender, previous partici-
pation in a statistics course, and following an economics study program. Lottery
controls: probabilities, outcomes and expected values of choice pair lotteries. Pre-
sentation controls: on-screen position of lotteries, and choice period.
Dependent variable Stated R2-rank in all regressions
Sample Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Lottery Lottery
a, R1 = 3 b, R1 = 4 a, R1 = 3 b, R1 = 4
Choice -0.194 -0.064 0.067 -0.245
(0.098) (0.113) (0.104) (0.110)
High -0.005 -0.197 -0.045 0.421
(0.169) (0.175) (0.253) (0.254)
Dominance -0.691 -0.417 -0.243 0.066
(0.477) (0.454) (0.296) (0.357)
Constant 4.190 3.476 -0.202 1.228
(0.602) (0.522) (0.873) (0.819)
Number of participants 140 140 156 156
Number of observations 560 560 624 624
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lottery controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Presentation controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster robust std. err. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Experiment 1 and type-b lotteries in Experiment 2; in contrast, the coefficients for type-b
lotteries in Experiment 1 and type-a lotteries in Experiment 2 were insignificant. The
results are robust to the inclusion of a broad set of control variables which we discuss
more thoroughly in the online supplementary materials.9
4.3 FCP pairs
For FCP pairs, the results replicated the standard choice-induced preference change
pattern. Lotteries chosen in FCP pairs improved on average by 0.279 ranks and 0.391
ranks from R1 to R2 in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Two-sided Wilcoxon-signed-
rank tests corroborate that the medians of these participant-averaged rank differences
were significantly different from zero (p = 0.001 and p < 0.001, respectively). Before the
9We also ran multiple robustness checks and alternative analyses, all of which confirmed our findings.
Specifically, we ran parametric t-tests, panel generalized-least-squares regressions on R2-ranks with par-
ticipant fixed-effects, and panel-tobit regressions on R2-ranks, acknowledging that ranks are censored
from below and from above. In addition, all regression analyses were run both including and excluding
observations involved in FOSD violations.
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critiques on the FCP were raised (Chen and Risen, 2010; Izuma and Murayama, 2013;
Alo´s-Ferrer and Shi, 2015), this could have been interpreted as evidence of preference
change. However, since the “chosen” options were not randomly predetermined, the
results merely reflect a statistical bias because being “chosen” carries information on the
underlying preferences whose change one intends to measure. The problem is particularly
acute if choices are more indicative of preferences than elicited rankings, as has been
argued in the economics literature (Schmidt and Hey, 2004; Butler and Loomes, 2007).
This might be the case in our data: pre-choice R1-ranks were only weakly indicative of
choices made in the 280 and 312 distinct FCP-pairs in our experiments. Participants
chose lottery a, the lottery revealed to be preferred in R1, in only 56% and 58% of
these pairs, respectively. These results demonstrate that the design flaw associated with
the FCP setup is a concern for economically valid domains and highlight the need for
improved designs (as the one generating our target pairs) to measure choice-induced
preference change.
5 Discussion
Undoubtedly, psychological insights have had a profound impact in modern economics.
However, it has to be recognized that economics and psychology have overlapping but
different objects of study. Psychologists have studied attitude change for decades, but
have not been concerned with economic choices per se. The latter require well-defined
consequences and incentives. When a psychologist studies whether our liking of an
artistic painting that we had never seen before or our abstract predisposition towards
spending holidays in a certain country (without reference to costs or duration) change
after we make the mental experiment of “putting us there” (making a hypothetical
choice), he or she is studying a perfectly valid psychological construct. An economist,
however, is fully justified to ask whether what we are seeing is initial taste formation, the
explicit discovery of our actual tastes, or an actual change of a well-defined preference.
The differences are consequential. With respect to preferences, economics is mostly
concerned with choices among well-defined alternatives with well-understood conse-
quences, or at least well-defined beliefs over those. Are preferences, as understood by
economists and as relevant for economics, affected by choice-induced preference change?
Answering this question requires a design with explicitly economic, well-understood
choices which are fully incentivized in a transparent way. Additionally, it has been
shown that experimental designs by psychologists suffer from statistical biases, which
are partly due to the fact that those designs operate on domains with hypothetical and
ill-defined choices. In this work, we present a design which addresses all those diffi-
culties. Choices are explicitly economic in nature, well-defined, with clearly-understood
consequences, and fully incentivized. Using this domain allows us to avoid any statistical
biases in the design by effectively randomizing choice through the recourse to first-order
stochastic dominance.
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We conducted two experiments with this design, with separate samples and different
manipulations leading to FOSD relations. We do find evidence which could be inter-
preted as choice-induced preference change. However, it is inconsistent in the sense that
the effect is observed for some lotteries and not others in one experiment, and exactly
the opposite pattern in the other experiment. This two-fold, asymmetric pattern is in
stark contrast with the extensive experimental literature from psychology which argues
for a robust and universally-reproducible choice-effect on preferences. Furthermore, our
observations are difficult to reconcile with any of the existing theoretical accounts of the
phenomenon, of which cognitive dissonance theory is the most prominent example. To
the best of our knowledge, neither this theory nor any of the alternatives put forward
over the years (e.g. Bem, 1967a,b) would predict the asymmetries we observe.
Of course, the asymmetries rest on lack of significance, and absence of evidence is
not evidence of absence, but the simplest explanation for the observed pattern at this
point is that choice-induced preference change in economic domains exists but is not
as strong as has been previously implied in other disciplines, and might depend on
seemingly-unimportant factors.
We understand our results as an opportunity to stimulate further research into this
topic. Our data does reflect an (inconsistent) effect of choice on preferences. Future
research should further investigate preference-change patterns to gain a better under-
standing of the boundary conditions of the phenomenon. For example, we study the pure
effect of uninformative choice on preference, whereas most existing previous studies in
psychology, which regrettably used a flawed design, can be seen as incorporating some
form of trade-off in choice. If trade-offs are a necessary precondition for the phenomenon
to emerge then appropriate experimental designs will have to be developed, with an eye
on separating this potential source from the pure effect of choice.
At this point, we conclude that economics should keep an open mind on the phe-
nomenon of choice-induced preference change, but maintain a healthy skepticism with
regards to its implications for economics. Down the road, it is clear that understand-
ing phenomena such as decision makers’ need for logical and cognitive consistency (e.g.,
with their own past choices) will help develop better preference elicitation methods and
improve predictive accuracy. At this point, however, there is no consistent theoretical
understanding of those phenomena and no clear way to import stylized facts from other
disciplines into economics.
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Online Appendix
A Robustness analyses
A.1 Experiment 1
We ran generalized least squares regressions with participant fixed-effects and partic-
ipant random-effects separately on stated R2-ranks as the dependent variable. Table
2 presents the results. All standard errors were clustered at the participant level and
we used the full sample of observations. Independent observations were taken at the
participant-lottery level. Our regression analysis confirms the findings reported in the
main text. The Choice dummy, taking value 1 if a lottery was chosen, is negative and
highly significant for type-a lotteries and negative and insignificant for type-b lotteries.
Chosen lotteries a were evaluated more positively, and, hence, received a lower rank in
R2, than comparable, but rejected lotteries a. As control for lottery specific features, we
included the Probability to win the high amount, henceforth p, in lotteries a and b as a
regressor. The corresponding coefficients were significant at the 5% level and negative.
Lotteries with a higher p were evaluated more positively in R2. In our set of lotteries
for Experiment 1, a higher p translates into a lower amount to win (see Table 4 below).
These lotteries thus represented low-risk, low-payout lotteries. Possible explanations
include a tendency to hedge for low-risk lotteries or fatigue effects that could influence
participants’ propensity to take risks. All other controls were either insignificant or not
robust across all model specifications. In particular, we controlled for the High amount
to win in lotteries a and b (salience effects), the absolute value of the Difference in
expected values between a and c and between b and d (the costs of violating FOSD),
whether or not the associated decision in the choice task violated FOSD (dummy Dom-
inance), whether or not the lottery was presented on the Right-hand side of the screen
in the choice task, and the Period in which the choice was taken. For the random-
effects approach we further controlled for the High treatment and several demographic
factors like age, gender, previous participation in a statistics course, and following an
economics-based study program.
A.2 Experiment 2
Table 3 reports generalized least squares regression results on the stated R2-ranks for
lotteries a and b in target pairs for Experiment 2. The interpretation is analogous to
that of Table 2. The regression analysis confirms our findings as descried in the main
text controlling for lottery-specific features, features of the choice environment, and
participant-specific characteristics. The Choice dummy was negative and significant at
the 5% level for type-b lotteries and insignificant for type-a lotteries. Lotteries b flagged
as chosen received a better, and therefore lower rank, than rejected lotteries b. We
again found that lottery characteristics, specifically the probability p to win the high
amount as well as the high amount itself, influenced stated R2-ranks independently of
choice. A higher p and a higher amount to win were associated with higher R2-ranks.
These lotteries were thus evaluated more negatively. Our lottery-construction process in
Experiment 2 did not follow a monotonic relationship between p and the high amount
to win as it did for Experiment 1. This was necessary due to the different process for
inducing FOSD relationships (see Table 5). Differences in the effect of lottery features
on stated R2-ranks across experiments could thus be attributed to the idiosyncratic
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Table 2: Panel generalized least squares regressions on R2-ranks for lotteries a and b
in target pairs, Experiment 1. We present both random and fixed-effect approaches.
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the participant level.
Dependent variable Stated R2-rank Stated R2-rank
Sample Lottery a, rank R1 = 3 Lottery b, rank R1 = 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Choice -0.187 -0.205 -0.194 -0.077 -0.059 -0.064
(0.102) (0.099) (0.098) (0.115) (0.115) (0.113)
Probability to win -1.139 -1.403 -0.873 -1.041
high amount (0.399) (0.372) (0.432) (0.403)
High amount to win -0.016 -0.005 0.005 0.006
(0.041) (0.034) (0.031) (0.027)
Difference in expected values 0.397 0.297 0.709 0.537
(1.411) (1.199) (1.104) (0.902)
Dominance -0.921 -0.691 -0.107 -0.417
(0.511) (0.477) (0.536) (0.454)
Right -0.192 -0.201 0.135 0.182
(0.129) (0.117) (0.138) (0.121)
Period 0.018 0.021 -0.022 -0.006
(0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021)
High -0.005 -0.197
(0.169) (0.175)
Constant 3.275 3.973 4.190 3.840 4.117 3.476
(0.051) (0.361) (0.602) (0.058) (0.323) (0.522)
Number of participants 140 140 140 140 140 140
Number of observations 560 560 560 560 560 560
Participant fixed-effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Participant random-effects No No Yes No No Yes
Demographic controls No No Yes No No Yes
Cluster robust std. err. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
differences between the two sets of lotteries used in the experiments. All other controls
were either found insignificant or not robust across all model specifications.
B The lotteries
Tables 4 and 5 below present all 72 lotteries used in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2,
respectively. The construction of the individual lotteries was guided by the following
principles.
1. No (first-order) dominance relation obtains among any pair of lotteries within a
given list.
2. Lotteries created during the choice task to induce dominance relations do not
duplicate any of the existing lotteries from a given list.
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Table 3: Panel generalized least squares regressions on R2-ranks for lotteries
a and b in target pairs, Experiment 2. We present both random and fixed-
effect approaches. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at
the participant level.
Dependent variable Stated R2-rank Stated R2-rank
Sample Lottery a, rank R1 = 3 Lottery b, rank R1 = 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Choice 0.041 0.046 0.067 -0.248 -0.242 -0.245
(0.106) (0.108) (0.104) (0.116) (0.111) (0.110)
Probability to win 2.592 2.310 4.030 3.512
high amount (0.836) (0.761) (0.901) (0.814)
High amount to win 0.466 0.448 0.576 0.473
(0.095) (0.090) (0.089) (0.081)
Difference in EV 1.415 0.607 -4.416 -5.721
(3.950) (3.522) (4.440) (3.946)
Dominance -0.383 -0.243 -0.026 0.066
(0.458) (0.296) (0.398) (0.357)
Right 0.208 0.095 0.133 0.075
(0.130) (0.119) (0.125) (0.113)
Period -0.029 -0.014 -0.016 -0.018
(0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018)
High -0.045 0.421
(0.253) (0.254)
Constant 3.137 -1.193 -0.202 3.878 -1.584 -1.228
(0.052) (0.885) (0.873) (0.059) (0.845) (0.819)
Number of participants 156 156 156 156 156 156
Number of observations 624 624 624 624 624 624
Subject fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject random-effects No No No No No No
Demographic controls No No Yes No No Yes
Cluster robust std. err. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3. All lotteries are non-degenerate, i.e. no certainty is involved.
4. The expected value of each lottery is bound between e3 and e5.
Point 1 aims to eliminate confounding factors in the ranking stages. The ranking
of lotteries reflect subjects’ preferences over lotteries involving trade-offs and are not
deductible from first principles. Point 2 preserves the measurement validity for critical
stimuli. No lottery was used both to elicit preferences and to induce choice patterns.
Point 3 avoids pitfalls commonly identified in judgment and decision making (e.g. the
certainty effect). The final point was motivated by our incentive scheme. Subjects
were remunerated for three tasks. We expected the experiments to last about 1 hour.
Subjects’ expected earnings met the remuneration standards set out by the laboratory
guidelines at the time (≈ e12, excluding show-up fee).
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Table 4: List of 36 lotteries used in Experiment 1. EV and Std. Dev. columns show the
expected value and the standard deviation of the lottery.
p Outcome 1 (1− p) Outcome 2 EV Std. Dev.
0.05 42 0.95 1 3.050 8.936
0.11 34 0.89 1 4.630 10.325
0.08 24 0.92 2 3.760 5.968
0.14 18 0.86 2 4.240 5.552
0.23 14 0.77 2 4.760 5.050
0.17 10 0.83 2.5 3.775 2.817
0.32 10 0.68 2 4.560 3.732
0.26 9 0.74 2.5 4.190 2.851
0.41 9 0.59 2 4.870 3.443
0.47 9 0.53 1 4.760 3.993
0.35 8.5 0.65 2.5 4.600 2.862
0.20 8 0.80 3 4.000 2.000
0.40 8 0.60 2.5 4.700 2.694
0.50 8 0.50 1.5 4.750 3.250
0.55 8 0.45 0.5 4.625 3.731
0.29 7.5 0.71 3 4.305 2.042
0.38 7 0.62 3 4.520 1.942
0.56 6.5 0.44 2.5 4.740 1.986
0.47 6.5 0.53 2 4.115 2.246
0.56 6.5 0.44 1.5 4.300 2.482
0.44 6 0.56 3 4.320 1.489
0.53 6 0.47 2.5 4.355 1.747
0.62 6 0.38 2 4.480 1.942
0.71 6 0.29 1 4.550 2.269
0.50 5.5 0.50 3.5 4.500 1.000
0.59 5.5 0.41 3 4.475 1.230
0.68 5.5 0.32 2.5 4.540 1.399
0.77 5.5 0.23 2 4.695 1.473
0.86 5.5 0.14 1 4.870 1.561
0.65 5 0.35 3.5 4.475 0.715
0.74 5 0.26 3 4.480 0.877
0.80 5 0.20 2.5 4.500 1.000
0.89 5 0.11 2 4.670 0.939
0.95 5 0.05 1 4.800 0.872
0.83 4.5 0.17 3.5 4.330 0.376
0.92 4.5 0.08 2.5 4.340 0.543
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Table 5: List of 36 lotteries used in Experiment 2. EV and Std. Dev. columns show the
expected value and the standard deviation of the lottery.
p Outcome 1 (1− p) Outcome 2 EV Std. Dev.
0.06 42.15 0.94 1.75 4.174 9.594
0.08 32.85 0.92 1.85 4.330 8.410
0.10 24.75 0.90 2.15 4.410 6.780
0.12 16.65 0.88 2.25 3.978 4.679
0.14 14.55 0.86 2.35 4.058 4.233
0.16 9.45 0.84 2.45 3.570 2.566
0.18 9.35 0.82 2.55 3.774 2.612
0.20 9.25 0.80 2.65 3.970 2.640
0.22 8.75 0.78 2.75 4.070 2.485
0.24 8.65 0.76 2.85 4.242 2.477
0.26 8.55 0.74 3.15 4.554 2.369
0.28 7.45 0.72 3.25 4.426 1.886
0.30 7.35 0.70 3.35 4.550 1.833
0.32 7.25 0.68 3.45 4.666 1.773
0.34 6.85 0.66 3.55 4.672 1.563
0.36 6.65 0.64 3.65 4.730 1.440
0.38 6.45 0.62 3.75 4.776 1.311
0.61 6.35 0.39 1.75 4.556 2.244
0.40 6.25 0.60 3.85 4.810 1.176
0.63 6.25 0.37 1.85 4.622 2.124
0.65 6.15 0.35 2.15 4.750 1.908
0.67 5.85 0.33 2.25 4.662 1.693
0.69 5.75 0.31 2.35 4.696 1.572
0.71 5.65 0.29 2.45 4.722 1.452
0.73 5.55 0.27 2.55 4.740 1.332
0.75 5.45 0.25 2.65 4.750 1.212
0.77 5.35 0.23 2.75 4.752 1.094
0.79 5.25 0.21 2.85 4.746 0.978
0.81 5.15 0.19 3.15 4.770 0.785
0.83 4.85 0.17 3.25 4.578 0.601
0.85 4.75 0.15 3.35 4.540 0.500
0.87 4.65 0.13 3.45 4.494 0.404
0.89 4.55 0.11 3.55 4.440 0.313
0.91 4.45 0.09 3.65 4.378 0.229
0.93 4.35 0.07 3.75 4.308 0.153
0.95 4.25 0.05 3.85 4.230 0.087
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C Experimental materials
We provide here a translated version of our experimental instructions. The original
instructions were in German and are available upon request. We did not explain FOSD
nor how choice pairs were constructed. This allowed us to use the same set of instructions
across treatments and experiments. The instructions included a quiz about the pie-chart
representation, which was checked by the experimenter present in a session. Participants
were only allowed to continue with the experiment once all questions were answered
correctly. This procedure ensured that all participants were able to read and understand
the lotteries and their pie-chart representation. Participants also had the opportunity to
gain familiarity with our computer interface in a practice round, which displayed letters
from the alphabet instead of lotteries and asked participants to rank the letters in an
alphabetically increasing order. Again, participants could only proceed to the actual
experiment once they ranked the letters correctly. These measures lead us to conclude
that all participants were capable of following our instructions and knew how to use the
computer interface for ranking purposes.
The instructions included sample screen-shots that presented pie-chart representa-
tions of lotteries as well as a sample screen-shot from the decision screen in stage 1
and stage 3 of the experiment. We provide translated versions of the screen-shots used
in the original German instructions in Figure 3. Additionally, we also provide sample
screen-shots from our decision screens in Figure 4.
General Instructions
(After a general-purpose welcome text from the lab)
Here is a brief summary of today’s protocol. The experiment consists of three inde-
pendent decision-parts. Each one asks you to make several decisions. A small question-
naire will follow.
You will earn money for each decision part. How much money you will earn depends
both on the decisions you make as well as on chance. The decision parts are independent
from each other and the decisions taken in one part do not influence your payoff from
any other part. We will add up your payoffs from the decision parts and you will also
receive an additional e2.50 for showing-up punctually today. The total sum of payoffs
will be paid out anonymously in cash after the experiment.
The next page contains further information about general procedures for today. All
other relevant information will be distributed before a decision part starts.
General Instructions, Continued.
Your decisions today will be about lotteries. We will therefore explain to you in
detail what is meant by a lottery and how it is represented on the computer screen.
A lottery consists of two possible EURO amounts which occur with certain probabil-
ities. Lotteries will be represented as pie charts; see the example screen-shot below. The
colored areas graphically represent the probabilities with which the monetary amounts
are obtained. The lottery in the example below has two outcomes, so there are two
colored areas.
Lottery example, continued
Consider the lottery from the example screen-shot (here the left-hand-side lottery in
Figure 3). The green area represents a 75% probability to win e10.00. The red area in
the pie-chart represents a 25% probability to win e5.00. If this lottery is played out to
determine your payoff, you would have the chance to win either of the two amounts. In
75 out of 100 random draws, you would win the e10.00, in 25 out of 100 random draws
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you would win the e5.00. Please notice that this is just an example. The actual lottery
amounts and probabilities in the experiment will be different from the examples used
here.
Please raise your hand if you have any further questions. If not, please answer the
quiz on the next page.
Quiz lotteries
The picture below shows another example of a pie-chart representation of a lottery
(here the right-hand-side lottery in Figure 3). Please answer the following questions.
Raise your hand when you are done and an assistant will come and check your answers.
1. What is the probability to win e3.00 for this lottery?
2. What is the probability to win e8.00 for this lottery?
3. Which amount can you win with a probability of 55% for this lottery?
4. Which amount can you win with a probability of 45% for this lottery?
Figure 3: Lotteries used in the instructions (translated).
Instructions, decision part 1
This part presents several lotteries on the screen simultaneously. For each displayed
lottery simply imagine that you own this lottery and that it will be played out according
to the probabilities and amounts specified in the pie-chart representation. Your task is
to rank each lottery displayed on screen according to how much you would like to play
it out in comparison to the other displayed lotteries.
In each decision round, the computer will display 6 different lotteries, see picture
below (see upper part of Figure 4). Please rank the lotteries in the following way.
• Please assign rank 1 first. Simply select the lottery among the displayed lotteries
you would like to play out the most.
• Please assign rank 2 then. Simply select the lottery among the displayed lotteries
you would like to play out the second-most.
• Please assign rank 3 then. Simply select the lottery among the displayed lotteries
you would like to play out the third-most.
7
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• Please assign rank 4 then. Simply select the lottery among the displayed lotteries
you would like to play out the fourth-most.
• Please assign rank 5 then. Simply select the lottery among the displayed lotteries
you would like to play out the fifth-most.
• Please assign rank 6 then.
To assign ranks simply click on the buttons below the lotteries. The assigned ranks
will be displayed below the lotteries too.
If you are not satisfied with your rank assignment and wish to change it, simply click
on reset. The rank assignment process will be restarted and you have to assign the ranks
anew.
Once you have assigned rank 1 (the lottery you would like to play out the most) to
rank 6 (the lottery you would like to play out the least), hit the ‘Done’ button to submit
your ranks and to proceed to the next decision round.
There are no right or wrong answers in assigning ranks. When assigning ranks,
simply ask yourself which is the lottery you would like to play out the most, second-
most, etc. Please notice that the ranks influence your payoff for this decision part; see
more details below.
In total, there will be 6 decisions rounds with 6 displayed lotteries each. The rounds
are independent of one another. That is, you will be asked to rank 6 different lotteries
according to your preferences 6 times. The next decision part will start as soon as you
are done with this part.
Before you start ranking lotteries you will get the opportunity to gain familiarity
with our computer interface in a practice round. The practice round is irrelevant for
your actual remuneration today. Once you are done with the practice round, the first
decision part will start.
Your payoff from decision part 1:
After you are done with ranking lotteries in all decision rounds, you will play out
exactly one lottery. To determine which one it is, the computer will first randomly select
one of the 6 decision rounds. Then the computer will randomly select two out of the 6
lotteries from this decision round. The computer will compare the two ranks of the two
lotteries selected and you will play out the lottery you ranked as more desirable (that is,
the lottery you would like to play out more from those two). The outcome that obtains
from playing out this lottery is your payoff for decision part 1. You will receive all payoff-
relevant information after you are done with all decision parts of today’s experiment.
Remember that although you will receive your payoff for this part at the end of the
experiment, your decisions made in this part do not influence your payoff in any other
part.
Please raise your hand if you have any further questions.
Instructions, decision part 2
This decision part of the experiment will present to you different lottery pairs se-
quentially. Your task is to choose one of the two displayed lotteries in each of the lottery
pairs presented.
The lotteries will be displayed on-screen in the following way (see lower part of Figure
4). One lottery will be shown at the left-hand side of the screen, the other lottery on
the right-hand side of the screen. Below each lottery a button labeled ‘This lottery’
will be shown. To chose the left-hand side lottery simply click on the button below the
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left-hand side lottery. To chose the right-hand side lottery simply click on the button
below this lottery. Please notice that the choices you make will influence your payoff
from this decision part; see details below.
There are no right or wrong answers in making choices. Choices are just a way to for
you to express which one of the two displayed lotteries you would like to play out more.
After you have indicated your choice, the next lottery pair will be presented. In
total, there will be 10 lottery pairs and we will start with the next decisions part once
you are done with indicating choice in all 10 lottery pairs.
Your payoff from decision part 2:
The computer will randomly select one of the 10 lottery pairs. For the selected pair,
the computer will check which lottery you have chosen. This is the lottery you will
play out. The outcome that obtains from playing out this lottery is your payoff for
decision part 2. You will receive all payoff-relevant information after you are done with
all decision parts of today’s experiment. Remember that although you will receive your
payoff for this part at the end of the experiment, your decisions made in this part do
not influence your payoff in any other part.
Please raise your hand if you have any further questions.
Instructions, decision part 3
This part again presents several lotteries on screen simultaneously. The lotteries,
your task, and the way your payoff is determined are the same as in decision part 1 of
today’s experiment. This is not a memory task. We want you take your decision as you
feel right now. For your convenience, we will now re-state the instructions from part 1.
Instructions for part 1 repeated here.
Your payoff from decision part 3:
Instructions for part 1 repeated here.
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Figure 4: Decision screens in the experiments. The top screen-shot presents the decision
screen for the ranking tasks. The bottom screen-shot shows the decision screen for the
choice task.
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